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Abstract: 
In 2006, Massachusetts passed health care reform legislation designed to achieve nearly 
universal coverage through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies 
that later served as the model for national health care reform. Using individual-level data from 
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, we provide evidence that health care reform in 
Massachusetts led to better overall self-assessed health. Several robustness checks and placebo 
tests support a causal interpretation of the results. We also document improvements in several 
determinants of overall health, including physical health, mental health, functional limitations, 
joint disorders, body mass index, and moderate physical activity. The health effects were 
strongest among women, minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with low incomes. Finally, we 
use the reform to instrument for health insurance and estimate a sizeable impact of coverage on 
health.  
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I. Introduction 
A major objective of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) signed into 
law in March of 2010 is to increase health insurance coverage in the United States to nearly 
universal levels through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies. 
Although the law survived constitutional challenges, it remains at the center of political debate, 
with possibilities remaining for full or partial repeal or denial of financing during the budgetary 
process. This ongoing debate highlights the need for projections of the law’s impacts on health, 
health care utilization, and state and federal budgets. The multi-faceted nature of the reform and 
breadth of the population affected suggests that evidence from coverage expansions in other 
contexts, such as Medicaid, will be of only limited usefulness.  
The most similar intervention to date to the ACA is the Massachusetts health care reform 
of April 2006, entitled “An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health 
Care” and commonly called “Chapter 58” (Long, 2008).1 The law enabled Massachusetts to 
lower its uninsurance rate to 2% by 2010 through a strategy called “incremental universalism,” 
or “filling the gaps in the existing system … rather than ripping up the system and starting over” 
(Massachusetts’ Division of Health Care, Finance and Policy, 2010; Gruber, 2008a:52). Gruber 
(2010) describes Massachusetts’ approach to incremental universalism as involving a “three 
legged stool” of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies (Gruber, 2010). 
The first leg of the stool reforms non-group insurance markets in an effort to ensure the 
availability of coverage for those without access to employer-provided or public insurance.  
Insurers are not allowed to deny or drop coverage based on pre-existing conditions (guaranteed 
issue) or vary premiums to reflect health status aside for limited adjustments for age and 
                                                        
1
 For a more detailed description of the law, see Long (2008), McDonough et al. (2006) and Gruber (2008a, 2008b). 
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smoking status (community rating) (Kirk, 2000; McDonough et al., 2006). A health insurance 
exchange, the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, offers plans developed by 
licensed health insurance companies for those without access to group markets. Enrollment on 
the Connector began in October 2006 for those with incomes below 100% of the federal poverty 
line (FPL), in January 2007 for those up to 300% FPL, and in May 2007 for everyone else. 
Additionally, private health insurance plans are required to provide coverage for young adults on 
their parents’ plans for up to two years after they are no longer dependents or until their 26th 
birthday (McDonough et al., 2006).2 
This first leg alone would likely lead to adverse selection and a “death spiral” with rising 
premiums gradually driving healthy individuals out of the non-group market. The second leg of 
the three-legged stool therefore involves mandates requiring adults to be covered by health 
insurance and employers to provide health insurance. Individuals without adequate coverage face 
a penalty of half of the lowest premium they would have paid in a Health Connector-certified 
plan. Employers with more than 10 employees must make a “fair and reasonable” contribution 
toward an employer health insurance plan or pay a state assessment of up to $295 per full-time 
equivalent worker per year (Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008).3 The 
mandates took effect in July 2007. 
To help low- and middle-income households be financially able to comply with the 
mandate, the third leg of the Massachusetts reform provides subsidies and Medicaid expansions. 
Chapter 58 specifies that health insurance be free for people below 150% FPL and that premiums 
                                                        
2
 Guaranteed issue and community rating have been in place in Massachusetts since 1996. The 1996 law only 
allowed premiums to vary with age and geography; Chapter 58 further allowed them to vary with tobacco use. The 
insurance exchange and the requirement regarding young adults on their parents’ plans both started with Chapter 58. 
3 Minimum requirements plans must meet to satisfy the mandates include coverage for prescription drugs and 
preventive and primary care, as well as maximums on deductibles and out-of-pocket spending. 
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be subsidized on a sliding scale for those between 150% and 300% FPL with no deductibles.4 
The reform also expands Medicaid to cover children below 300% FPL (McDonough et al., 
2006). 
Taking into account the costs of the subsidies and Medicaid expansions as well as the 
savings from reduced safety net payments, Raymond (2009) estimates the annual fiscal cost of 
the reform to be $707 million. Through a waiver allowing for a more flexible use of federal 
Medicaid matching money, half of this amount comes from the federal government, leaving the 
state government’s share at $353 million. 
Table 1 compares Massachusetts’ approach to incremental universalism with that of the 
Affordable Care Act. 5  Though there are differences in some of the details, both the 
Massachusetts and national reforms were clearly motivated by the same “three-legged stool” 
approach to incremental universalism. Both featured guaranteed issue, community rating, 
insurance exchanges, mandates, Medicaid expansions, and subsidies. For these reasons, 
analyzing the effects of health care reform in Massachusetts provides the best available predictor 
to date of the implications of the Affordable Care Act. 
Given that recent nature of the Massachusetts reform, researchers are only beginning to 
understand its impacts. Long et al. (2009) find that by 2008 the uninsured rate decreased by 6.6 
percentage points for the overall nonelderly population and 17.3 percentage points for lower-
income adults.6 Long and Stockely (2011) find a decrease in unmet medical needs because of 
                                                        
4
 For instance, in 2008 a family with an income between 150% and 200% of the poverty line paid a premium of $35 
per adult, while a family with an income in the 250% to 300% range paid $105 per adult. 
5
 Coverage expansion was the primary focus of both the Massachusetts and national reforms.  However, the national 
reform was more comprehensive, consisting of nine titles that each had their own reform agenda: I. Insurance 
Coverage, II. Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, III. Delivery System Reform, IV. Prevention 
and Wellness, V. Workforce initiatives, VI. Fraud, Abuse and Program Integrity, VII. Biologic Similars, VIII. 
Community Living Assistance Services and Supports, IX. Revenue Provisions (Patel and McDonough, 2010). 
6 These results support preliminary evidence found by Long (2008) using information from 2006 and 2007. 
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cost among lower income adults but also some evidence of delays in care from being unable to 
find a provider. Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) show that Chapter 58’s impact on coverage was 
mitigated by the crowding out of private insurance. They also investigate the reform’s effect on 
self-assessed health, finding mixed results: an increase in the probability of reporting at least 
good health but a decrease in the probability of reporting at least very good health. Cogan et al. 
(2010) estimate that the reform increased employer-sponsored insurance premiums by about 6%. 
Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) show that the reform reduced levels of uninsurance by 36% among 
the population of hospital discharges. Length of stay and the number of inpatient admissions 
originating from the emergency room both decreased, with some evidence also suggesting an 
increase in the utilization of preventive services, a decline in hospitalizations for preventable 
conditions, and an improvement in quality of care. Miller (2011a) finds a reduction in non-urgent 
emergency room visits, consistent with the newly-insured having access to such care in other 
settings. Miller (2011b) focuses on children’s outcomes, finding a substitution from emergency 
room care to office visits, a reduction in medical needs unmet because of cost, and an increase in 
the probability of reporting excellent health. Kowalski and Kolstad (2012) exploit the reform’s 
effect on employer-provided health insurance to show that wage reductions almost completely 
offset the cost of health insurance benefits. 
We contribute to this growing literature by examining Chapter 58’s effect on the self-
assessed health of adults. Though many open questions remain about the reform’s effectiveness, 
as Gruber (2011b:190) writes, “the most significant of these is the impact of reform on the health 
of citizens.” We utilize individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS), which allows for the use of longer pre- and post-treatment periods, a much 
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larger sample, and a broader range of health-related questions than Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), 
enabling us to obtain clearer results.7       
First, an ordered probit difference-in-differences analysis shows that the reform increased 
the probability of individuals reporting excellent or very good health while reducing their 
probability of reporting good, fair, or poor health. A variety of robustness checks and placebo 
tests support a causal interpretation of the results. The estimates suggest that annual government 
spending for each adult transitioned into excellent or very good health is $9,827, split evenly 
between the Massachusetts and federal governments. We then provide evidence that the reform 
improved a number of determinants of overall self-assessed health: physical health, mental 
health, functional limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and moderate physical activity. 
Next, we examine heterogeneity and find that the reform’s effect on overall health was strongest 
for women, minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with incomes low enough to qualify for the 
law’s subsidies. Notably, the estimates imply a 19% reduction in the disparity in self-reported 
health between blacks and whites. Finally, we exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in 
coverage created by the reform to estimate that obtaining health insurance leads to a large 
improvement in health. 
II. Health Insurance and Health 
An important part of the argument for universal coverage is the assumption that health 
insurance improves health. As quoted by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), Levy and Meltzer (2008) 
write, 
                                                        
7
 Specifically, Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) use Current Population Survey supplements and compare a pre-
treatment period of 2005-2006 with a post-treatment period of 2008.  They conduct a difference-in-differences 
analysis with other New England states as controls.  Their sample size is 41,873.  In contrast, we utilize data from 
2001-2010 and have a sample size of 2,879,296 in our main analysis and 340,592 when we restrict the sample to 
New England.    
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The central question of how health insurance affects health, for whom it matters, and how 
much, remains largely unanswered at the level of detail needed to inform policy 
decisions. … Understanding the magnitude of health benefits associated with insurance is 
not just an academic exercise …, it is crucial to ensuring that the benefits of a given 
amount of public spending on health are maximized (p. 400). 
This section provides a brief summary of theoretical and empirical research on the topic and 
summarizes our contribution to this broader literature. 
Grossman (1972) models health as a durable capital stock that is also an input in the 
production of healthy time. Health capital depends on the initial endowment of health, past 
period health, and past period investments made to preserve it. Medical care and time spent in 
health producing activities are the main forms of health investment. Every period people face 
uncertainty as to whether they will be affected by a negative health shock, so they buy health 
insurance to protect themselves against unexpected medical costs. Because health insurance 
reduces the price of care faced by the consumer it increases the demand for medical care (Arrow, 
1963; Pauly, 1968). This increase in consumption of care could result in better health, but if the 
additional medical care is redundant health outcomes may remain the same or even deteriorate. 
This effect is sometimes known as “flat of the curve” medical care, because diminishing returns 
in the health production function imply that at some point the health gains associated with more 
medical care may be very small (Doyle, 2005).  
The majority of empirical investigations into the relationship between health insurance 
and health are observational studies that use multivariate regression analysis. A review of these 
studies by Hadley (2003) shows that 15 out of the 20 published between 1991 and 2001 found a 
positive association between health insurance coverage and recovery from health conditions such 
as cancer, trauma, and appendicitis. Health insurance was also associated with better overall 
health status and lower mortality risk in all of the studies that examined these outcomes. 
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However, these relationships cannot be interpreted as causal because the research designs did not 
address the potential for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. 
During the 1970’s the RAND Health insurance experiment randomly assigned families to 
health insurance plans with coinsurance rates ranging from 0% to 95%, with all medical 
expenses covered over a threshold. Medical care use increased among people assigned to plans 
with lower coinsurance rates, but health outcomes only improved among the poor (Manning et 
al., 1987). However, this experiment only shows the impact of health insurance along the 
intensive margin from less to more generous coverage, not the extensive margin of no coverage 
to any coverage. It is also unclear to what extent findings from the 1970s are applicable today.  
Some studies have taken advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation provided by 
public insurance programs like Medicaid and Medicare in order to address the endogeneity of 
coverage. Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b) find that Medicaid expansions decrease infant 
mortality and low birth weight, while Dafny and Gruber (2005) show that they also reduce 
avoidable hospitalizations among children. Most recently, Finkelstein et al. (2011) exploit a 2008 
Oregon lottery in which winners were given the chance to apply for Medicaid to show that 
coverage improves self-reported physical and mental health. The randomization allows for clean 
identification of the causal effects of Medicaid eligibility, at least among the low-income 
uninsured lottery participants.   
Evidence on the effect of Medicare on the health of seniors is mixed. Card et al. (2004) 
find that obtaining Medicare coverage at age 65 improves the self-assessed health of Hispanics 
and people with low levels of education; however, the effect for the whole sample is smaller and 
insignificant. Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) show that 10 years after the introduction of 
Medicare there was not a statistically significant impact on mortality rates for people older than 
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65. Card et al. (2009) find more favorable results: a reduction in the 7-day mortality rate among 
emergency room patients older than 65 compared to those right below that cutoff.  
A few studies attempt to estimate the causal effect of insurance on health in contexts 
other than public programs, again finding mixed results. Pauly (2005) uses marital status and 
firm size as instruments for private insurance coverage and finds a positive but insignificant 
effect of insurance on self-reported health and a negative but insignificant effect on the 
probability of having a chronic condition. Doyle (2005) shows that uninsured patients receive 
less medical care and have higher mortality rates than insured patients after a random health 
shock (a car accident). 
To summarize, the extant literature suggests that health insurance coverage appears to 
improve health in some contexts but not others. The uninsured in the U.S. consist of a number of 
groups, including those too sick to obtain coverage, those too healthy to feel insurance is 
necessary, and those too poor to afford private coverage but not poor enough to qualify for 
public insurance programs. Any attempt at universal coverage in the U.S. will therefore involve 
coverage expansions across a highly heterogeneous group, making it unclear the extent to which 
these prior findings are applicable. The Massachusetts health care reform provides a unique 
opportunity to examine an intervention that affects a large portion of the uninsured population.     
III. Data 
 Health summarizes a combination of factors that reflect physical and mental well-being. 
Among the usual indicators used to measure health in empirical investigations are mortality 
rates, hospitalization rates, and self-assessments of overall health. Our study focuses on self-
assessments. State-level mortality information is not currently available for a long enough time 
after the reform to construct an adequate post-treatment period. Even if more recent data were 
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available, examining mortality rates alone would not capture incremental improvements in health 
resulting from, for instance, better treatment for a chronic but non-life threatening condition. 
Hospitalizations are not an appropriate measure of overall health in this context since, to the 
extent that hospitalizations are price sensitive, changes in hospitalizations after the reform might 
simply be a direct result of the lower price faced by the newly-insured rather than changes in 
health. 
 This paper uses data from the BRFSS, a telephone survey of health and health behaviors 
conducted by state health departments in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. The BRFSS, which consists of repeated annual cross sections of randomly-sampled 
adults, is well suited for our analysis for several reasons. First, the dataset contains the necessary 
variables, including multiple self-reported health measures, demographic characteristics, and 
state, month, and year identifiers. Second, since the BRFSS spans 1984 to 2010 and included all 
50 states plus the District of Columbia by 1995, the data cover a long enough time period to 
examine both post-reform outcomes and pre-reform trends. Third, the BRFSS contains an 
unusually large number of observations – over 2.8 million in our analysis sample of 2001 
through 2010. A large sample is critical to obtaining meaningful precision when examining the 
impact of a state-level program with effects that might be concentrated amongst only a fraction 
of the population.  
 Our main dependent variable is a self-reported health index asking respondents to rate 
their overall health as poor (0), fair (1), good (2), very good (3), or excellent (4). This index has 
been previously used by other studies analyzing the impact of health insurance on health (Card et 
al., 2004; Pauly, 2005; Yelowitz and Cannon, 2010) and has been repeatedly shown to be 
correlated with objective measures of health such as mortality (e.g. Idler and Benyamini, 1997; 
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DeSalvo et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2010). According to Idler and Benyamini, another advantage 
of the index is that it is a global measure of health that captures the full range of diseases and 
limitations a person may have.  
The primary concern with the self-reported health index is its subjective nature. We will 
be able to flexibly control for the sources of reporting heterogeneity identified in the literature, 
such as age, income, and gender (Ziebarth, 2010). Nonetheless, the estimated effect of the reform 
on self-assessed health could still reflect factors beyond objective health.  For instance, improved 
access to medical care might increase awareness about medical conditions, causing one to self-
report a lower health status after obtaining insurance coverage, ceteris paribus (Strauss and 
Thomas, 2007). In this case, the reform’s effect on self-assessed health would be smaller than its 
effect on objective health. Alternatively, if the peace of mind from having health insurance 
influences one’s answers to subjective health-related questions, the reform could lead to larger 
improvements in self-assessed health than objective health. 
Consequently, we also utilize a number of other health-related dependent variables in an 
attempt to verify that the results for the overall self-reported health index are not driven merely 
by subjectivity. First, we consider number of days out of the past 30 not in good physical health 
and number of days out of the past 30 not in good mental health. These variables are somewhat 
less subjective than the overall health index because the respondents are specifically asked to 
consider a particular component of health. Even less subjective is the next health measure: 
number of days out of the past 30 with health-related functional limitations. Our last five health-
related dependent variables – an indicator for the presence of activity-limiting joint pain, body 
mass index (BMI), minutes per week of moderate physical activity, minutes per week of 
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vigorous physical activity, and an indicator for whether the individual currently smokes – are 
quite specific and therefore the least open to subjective interpretation.8 9  
We measure coverage with a binary variable reflecting whether or not the individual has 
“any kind of health care coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or 
government plans such as Medicare.” The BRFSS does not indicate the source of coverage or 
provide any information on premiums, deductibles, or copayments. Finally, we utilize as control 
variables the BRFSS’ information on age, marital status, race, income, education, marital status, 
and current pregnancy status.  
We also include four state-level variables as controls in a robustness check. The first is 
monthly state unemployment rate, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Next, monthly 
state cigarette excise tax rates come from The Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and 
Walker, 2010) and are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for all urban 
consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, we use annual state hospital and 
physician data from the Census Bureau to impute monthly estimates of numbers of hospitals and 
physicians per 100,000 residents.10 
 Our analysis uses a ten-year window surrounding the reform, 2001 to 2010. Tables 2 and 
3 compare the descriptive statistics for Massachusetts and the other states in the pre-treatment 
                                                        
8
 BMI=weight in kilograms divided by height in squared meters.  Self-reported weight and height are potentially 
susceptible to biases. Some researchers utilize an adjustment developed by Cawley (2004) that predicts actual height 
and weight based on self-reported height and weight using the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 
and then applies the prediction equation to other datasets that only include the self-reported measures.  However, 
studies with BMI as the dependent variable have repeatedly found that applying this adjustment has little influence 
on the results, so we do not use it here (e.g. Courtemanche et al., 2011).    
9
 The BRFSS gives respondents guidance for how to distinguish between moderate and vigorous physical activity, 
reducing the subjectivity of these variables.  Moderate activities include “brisk walking, bicycling, vacuuming, 
gardening, or anything else that causes small increases in breathing or heart rate.”  Vigorous activities include 
“running, aerobics, heavy yard work, or anything else that causes large increases in breathing or heart rate.” 
10
 Monthly estimates were calculated using the formula:  = 	 + 	 ( − 	), where 	 and  are annual 
estimates, and  is number of months from 	 to  . 
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period of January 2001 through March 2006. Prior to the reform, Massachusetts was already 
healthier than the rest of the country along most dimensions and had a higher coverage rate. 
Massachusetts residents averaged higher income and more education than those in other states, 
and were more likely to be single and white. Massachusetts also had a relatively low 
unemployment rate, high cigarette tax, high physician density, and low hospital density. These 
baseline differences illustrate the difficulty in isolating the causal impact of Massachusetts’ 
health care reform. A naïve estimator using only a post-treatment cross section would attribute 
the entire difference in health between Massachusetts and other states to the reform, including 
the part of the difference that was already present prior to its enactment. Our empirical analysis 
will therefore rely on a difference-in-differences estimator that controls for pre-treatment 
differences in state health as well as a number of time-varying observable characteristics. 
 As a precursor to the regression analysis, Figure 1 plots the average values of the health 
status index in Massachusetts and the 50 control states (the other 49 states plus Washington, DC) 
every year from 2001 to 2010, along with their 95% confidence intervals. The graph also shows 
linear pre-treatment trends for Massachusetts and the other states, computed by regressing the 
mean health index on year plus a constant term. Consistent with the summary statistics from 
Table 2, Massachusetts residents had better average self-assessed health than those in the control 
states even before the reform. Despite this difference in baseline levels, the pre-treatment trends 
in both Massachusetts and the other states were both downward sloping and – critically for the 
validity of the difference-in-differences approach – almost exactly parallel. The year-to-year 
fluctuations in the control states in the pre-treatment period are estimated very precisely and lie 
almost exactly on top of the trend line, while the year-to-year fluctuations in Massachusetts are 
estimated much less precisely and deviate more substantially. This underscores the importance of 
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utilizing a sufficiently long pre-treatment period in the regression analysis. If, for instance, 2005 
– a year in which health in Massachusetts appears to have been below trend – was the only pre-
treatment year, a difference-in-differences estimate might capture mean reversion in addition to 
the causal effect.  
After the reform was passed in 2006, health in the control states remained relatively 
stable. In contrast, health in Massachusetts improved in 2006 – as the subsidies and Medicaid 
expansions took effect in the early stages of the reform’s implementation – and again in 2009. 11 
To more formally investigate whether these improvements were a causal response to health care 
reform, we next turn to regression analysis. The regression results will broadly support the 
preliminary findings from Figure 1, although we will see that in a regression context the health 
gains did not appear until 2007.  
IV. Regression Analysis 
IVa. Baseline Model 
We estimate the impact of Massachusetts health care reform on overall self-assessed 
health status using an ordered probit difference-in-differences model.12 Suppose the underlying 
relationship between the covariates and a latent variable representing health (∗) is given by 
 ∗ =  + 	( ∗ ) + ( ∗ ) +  !"# $% + & + ' + ( (1) 
                                                        
11
 Figure 1 may help explain the mixed results found by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010).  Their pre-treatment years 
were 2005, in which health in Massachusetts was off its long-run trend line, and 2006, in which a causal response to 
the early aspects of the reform was possible.  Their only post-treatment year was 2008, before the second spike in 
the health in Massachusetts residents seen in 2009. 
12 Given the strong distributional assumptions made by the ordered probit model, we also considered two more 
flexible approaches to modeling the impact of the reform on health.  The first estimates a series of four probits with 
the dependent variables being indicators for fair or better, good or better, very good or better, and excellent health.  
The second uses the same dependent variables but estimates linear probability models. The conclusions reached are 
the same; the results are shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
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where i, s, and t are indices for individual, state, and month/year combination (e.g. January 
2001).  is a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in Massachusetts. Following 
Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we define  as a dummy variable equal to 1 from April 
2006 to June 2007, the time period after the law had been passed but before all the key 
provisions had been implemented.  is a dummy variable equal to 1 starting in July of 2007, 
when the final major component of the reform – the individual mandate – took effect.  !"#  
consists of the age, marital status, race, income, education, and pregnancy variables listed in 
Table 3. & and ' are state and month fixed effects, while ( is the error term.  
We do not observe ∗  and instead observe an ordinal health measure  such that 
 
 =
)*
+
*,
0	if	∗ ≤ 2		1	if	2	 < ∗ ≤ 22	if	2 < ∗ ≤ 263	if	26 < ∗ ≤ 284	if	∗ > 28
 
(2) 
where 2	 through 28 are constants that represent the cut-off points. An ordered probit regression 
of  on the covariates from (1) computes the following probabilities of being in each of the 
five health states:   
 Pr( = 0) = Φ(>	 − 	( ∗ ) − ( ∗ ) −  !"# $% − & −') (3) 
 Pr( = ?)= Φ@>A − 	( ∗ ) − ( ∗ ) −  !"# $% − & −'B− 	Φ@>AC	 − 	( ∗ ) − ( ∗ ) −  !"# $% − & − 'B	∀	E ∈ (2,3,4) 
(4) 
 Pr( = 4) = 1 − Φ(>8 − 	( ∗ ) − ( ∗ ) −  !"# $% −& −') (5) 
where >A = 2A − , the cutoff points adjusted for the constant term. The coefficient of interest is 
, which captures the difference between the change in Massachusetts from the “before” to the 
“after” period and the change in the control states from the before to the after period – in other 
words, the “difference in differences.”  
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Computing treatment effects in non-linear models has been the source of confusion in the 
literature. Ai and Norton (2003) showed that the cross difference in a nonlinear model is 
different from the marginal effect on the interaction term, and could even be the opposite sign.  
However, Puhani (2008) showed that the cross difference identified by Ai and Norton (2003) is 
not the same as the treatment effect, and that when the treatment effect is the parameter of 
interest it is appropriate to focus on the coefficient of the interaction term.  A similar observation 
has been made by Terza (2012). Following Puhani (2008), our “treatment effect on the treated” 
is given by 
 H( = 1, = 1) = IJK	| = 1, = 1,,'M − IJK| = 1, = 1,,'M (6) 
where K	  and K  are potential outcomes with and without treatment. The “average treatment 
effect on the treated” is the mean of this treatment effect across those individuals living in 
Massachusetts in the “after” period (July 2007 through December 2009).  
Because of the nonlinearity of the model, the treatment effect depends on the value of the 
other covariates. The effects of the reform on the probabilities of being in each of the five health 
states among the treated are 
 H ,NO,"( = 0) = Φ@>	 −  − ,NO,"# $% − &PQ − 'B − Φ@>	 −  ,NO,"# $% − &PQ −'B (7) 
 H ,NO,"( = E)= RΦ@>A −  − ,NO,"# $% − &PQ −'B − 	Φ@>AC	 −  −  ,NO,"# $% − &PQ −'BS− RΦ@>A −  ,NO,"# $% − &PQ − 'B − 	Φ@>AC	 −  ,NO,"# $% − &PQ − 'BS	 ∀	E ∈ (2,3,4) 
(8) 
 H ,NO,"( = 4)= 1 −Φ@>8 −  − ,NO,"# $% − &PQ − 'B − R1 − Φ@>8 − ,NO,"# $% − &PQ −'BS= Φ@>8 −  ,NO,"# $% − &PQ − 'B − Φ@>8 −  −  ,NO,"# $% − &PQ −'B 
(9) 
 
where the state subscript T has been replaced by  for Massachusetts, and  is restricted to the 
“after” period. 
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 The key identifying assumption in the difference-in-differences model is that  ∗
 and  ∗  are uncorrelated with the error term. In other words, the estimates 
can be interpreted as causal effects of the reform if we assume that in the absence of the reform 
changes over time in health would have been the same in Massachusetts and the control states, 
conditional on the control variables. The similarity of Massachusetts’ pre-treatment trend in 
health to that of the other states shown in Figure 1 provides preliminary support for this 
assumption. We therefore use all 50 other states (49 states plus the District of Columbia) as the 
control group in the baseline regression, and consider several alternatives in Section IVb. 
Our standard errors in the baseline regression are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered 
by state. As shown by Bertrand et al. (2004), conventional difference-in-differences methods can 
over-reject the null hypothesis because of serial correlation even when standard errors are 
clustered. We therefore use more stringent standards for statistical significance than usual: 0.1%, 
1%, and 5% significance levels. In Section IVe we will more formally investigate whether 
underestimated standard errors could be driving our conclusions. 
The first column of Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for  ∗   and 
 ∗  from the ordered probit regression, along with the average treatment effects on the 
treated in the after period.13 The interaction term  ∗  is statistically significant at the 
1% level and its effect on health is positive, suggesting than health care reform began to improve 
the health of Massachusetts residents even before the reform was fully implemented. This is 
plausible since some provisions of the reform, such as the Medicaid expansions and subsidies for 
those below 300% FPL, started in 2006. The interaction term  ∗  is significant at the 
0.1% level and its coefficient estimate is more than twice as large as that for  ∗ . Not 
                                                        
13
 Coefficient estimates for the other covariates are available upon request. 
 17 
 
surprisingly, the effect of the reform strengthened once it was fully implemented. This could 
either represent the impact of the later components, such as the mandate, or a gradual response to 
the earlier components. The t-statistic for  ∗  is 6.5, meaning that our clustered standard 
errors would have to be underestimated by a factor of more than three for the result to be driven 
by autocorrelation. 
 The estimated average treatment effects show that the Massachusetts health care reform 
decreased the probabilities of being in poor, fair and good health and increased the probabilities 
of being in very good and excellent health. The drops in the probabilities of being in poor, fair, 
and good health are 0.2, 0.5, and 0.7 percentage points, respectively, while the increases in the 
probabilities of being in very good and excellent health are 0.2 and 1.2 percentage points.  
We next conduct two back-of-the-envelope calculations to help assess the economic 
significance of these estimates. The first consolidates the five treatment effects into a single 
measure that attempts to quantify the overall increase in health. We multiply each of the 
treatment effects by the value of the health status index associated with the corresponding 
category (0 for poor, 1 for fair, 2 for good, 3 for very good, and 4 for excellent), and then divide 
by the sample standard deviation. This result is an overall effect on health of 0.033 standard 
deviations, shown in the third-to-last row of Table 4.14 The magnitude of the impact therefore 
appears modest across the entire population, but perhaps large amongst the small fraction of the 
population who experienced a change in coverage as a result of the reform and is likely driving 
the results.  
                                                        
14
 This calculation should be interpreted with caution, as it relies on the strong assumption that each incremental 
increase in the health index represents the same improvement in health. 
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 The second calculation combines the estimated treatment effects with the information on 
the reform’s costs from the introduction to compute the annual fiscal cost for each adult 
transitioned from poor, fair, or good health to very good or excellent health. We do this first 
considering total government spending (federal and state), and then using only Massachusetts’ 
share of that spending. The former provides a more relevant projection for national health care 
reform, while the latter is more relevant for evaluations of the Massachusetts reform. 1.4% of the 
adult population transitioned into very good or excellent health. The adult population in 
Massachusetts was 5,138,919 in July 2010 according to the Census, so 1.4% translates to 71,945 
individuals. Since the reform cost an estimated $707 million in FY2010, total government 
spending is an estimated $9,827 per year for every adult whose health improves from poor, fair, 
or good to very good or excellent. Since Massachusetts splits the costs evenly with the federal 
government, the state spends approximately $4,914 annually per adult transitioned into very 
good or excellent health. These calculations are far from complete cost-effectiveness analyses, as 
they ignore costs to patients and private insurers as well as benefits from consumption smoothing 
or improvements in children’s health. They do, however, provide some information about the 
returns to government spending while underscoring the point that financing universal coverage at 
the federal level is likely to be more difficult than in Massachusetts, as matching money is not 
available.  
IVb. Robustness Checks 
This section further examines the validity of the identifying assumption of common 
counterfactual health trends between Massachusetts and the rest of the country by considering a 
number of alternative control groups and adding state-level covariates. First, we use as the 
control group the ten states with the most similar pre-treatment average health status indices to 
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Massachusetts (“match on pre-treatment levels”). Second, we “match on pre-treatment trends” 
by running regressions of average health on year plus a constant term for each state from 2001-
2005 and then choosing as the comparison group the ten states with the most similar slopes to 
Massachusetts. Next, we use a control group of the ten states with the most similar pre-reform 
health insurance coverage rates (“match on pre-treatment coverage”).15  We then consider a 
control group consisting of the other New England states because of their geographic proximity 
to Massachusetts. An additional specification excludes states that passed more limited health 
care reforms during the sample period (California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon and Vermont). 
The sixth robustness check constructs a “synthetic control group” for Massachusetts, as 
described by Abadie et al. (2010). We first aggregate to the state-by-year level and allow the data 
to select the combination of the other 50 states that best matches Massachusetts on health status 
and the control variables during the pre-treatment years 2001-2005.16 The resulting control group 
is 70.9% Connecticut, 11.3% Rhode Island, 8% Washington, D.C., 5.9% Utah, 3.7% California, 
and 0.1% Arizona. Following Fitzpatrick’s (2008) application of this method to individual data, 
we then multiply the weights for the individual-level observations by these shares, leaving 
Massachusetts fully weighted and dropping the 44 states that received a zero weight.17 
The next regression uses the rest of the country as the control group but excludes the year 
2005. Recall from Figure 1 that in 2005 health in Massachusetts was below the trend line, raising 
                                                        
15
 When matching on pre-treatment levels, the control states are Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont and Virginia.  When matching on pre-treatment 
trends, the control states are Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New 
Jersey and New York.  When matching on pre-treatment coverage, the control states are Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Unreported 
regressions used control groups of five or twenty states instead of ten; the results were similar.   
16
 We do this using the Stata module “synth” (Abadie et al., 2011). 
17
 In the “matching on pre-treatment levels,” “matching on pre-treatment trends,” New England, and synthetic 
control regressions, the number of states is 11 or fewer. Angrist and Pischke (2008) note that standard errors 
clustered by state are unreliable when the number of states is small. As they recommend, we instead cluster standard 
errors at the state-by-year level in these four regressions.   
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the question of whether the improvement in health from 2005 to 2006 could be due to a 
temporary negative shock in 2005 rather than the reform in 2006. The long pre-treatment period 
mitigates this concern by tempering the influence of 2005, but dropping 2005 addresses it more 
directly.18  
Finally, we return to the full sample but control for the potential time-varying state-level 
confounders unemployment rate, cigarette tax rate, physician density, and hospital density, along 
with linear state-specific time trends to allow for differential trends in health along unobservable 
dimensions.19 Controlling for unemployment rate and cigarette tax could be especially important 
given the differential impacts of the recession across states and the large cigarette tax increase 
passed in Massachusetts in 2009.  
We present the results of these robustness checks in Columns 2 through 9 of Table 4. The 
coefficient of the interaction term  ∗   remains positive in all specifications, with 
magnitudes ranging from 0.010 to 0.022, though it loses statistical significance in some of the 
regressions with smaller control groups. In contrast, the interaction term  ∗  remains 
highly significant in all specifications. The magnitude of its effect is stable, as it ranges from 
0.032 to 0.049 and is always within the 95% confidence interval from the baseline regression. As 
a result the treatment effects are also similar across specifications.  
 
 
                                                        
18
 Other unreported robustness checks experimented with the use of shorter pre-treatment periods beginning in 2002, 
2003, or 2004.  The results remained very similar.  
19
 We relegate the state-level control variables to a robustness check rather than using them in the main analysis 
because of concerns that some of them – in particular unemployment rate, physician density, and hospital density –
could be endogenous to health care reform.  Moreover, the four state-level controls are all individually and jointly 
insignificant, so the state fixed effects appear to sufficiently capture their influence on health.  
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IVc. Testing for Differential Pre-Treatment Trends and Delayed Effects  
 This section simultaneously addresses two possible concerns with the estimates from 
Table 4. First, the difference-in-differences approach assumes common counterfactual health 
trends between Massachusetts and the rest of the country. The robustness of the estimates to 
different constructions of the control group is consistent with this assumption, but conceivably 
health trends in Massachusetts could be so unique that no appropriate comparison group of states 
exists. Second, the preceding regressions do not differentiate between the short- and long-run 
health effects of the reform following full implementation. Since health is a capital stock 
accumulated through repeated investments, the improvements in health resulting from the reform 
could increase over time. Alternatively, the long-term uninsured might experience a pent-up 
demand for medical services after obtaining coverage, in which case the entire improvement in 
health could be reached quickly or even be temporary. 
 We address these issues by re-estimating equation (1) with a broader set of interaction 
terms. First, we divide the ten-year sample into five two-year periods and include interactions of 
the Massachusetts dummy with indicators for 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2010 
(leaving 2001-2002 as the reference period). A second regression interacts Massachusetts with a 
full set of year dummies. These models test the common trends assumption by testing for 
differential trends between Massachusetts and other states in the pre-treatment period 2001-2005. 
If the treatment and control groups were trending similarly before the reform, then they likely 
would have continued to trend similarly from 2006-2010 if the reform had not occurred. The 
models also distinguish between short- and long-run effects by including multiple interactions 
from the post-reform period. 
 22 
 
 Table 5 displays the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms. The regression with 
two-year splits shows that health trends in Massachusetts and other states were similar through 
the pre-treatment period, with a sizeable gap emerging in the early period following the reform’s 
full implementation (2007-2008) that grew only slightly in the later period (2009-2010). These 
results are consistent with the reform having a positive causal effect on health, and with the 
short- and long-run effects being similar. The results from the one-year splits are broadly similar, 
with the exception that Massachusetts experienced a temporary negative health shock in 2005 
that disappeared by 2006. At no point in the pre-treatment period was there a Massachusetts-
specific health shock that lasted longer than one year, making it unlikely that the sustained 
improvement in health in Massachusetts from 2007-2010 would have occurred in the absence of 
the reform. Moreover, the regression excluding 2005 from Table 4 provides further evidence that 
the negative shock in Massachusetts in 2005 is not meaningfully influencing our conclusions.20   
IVd. Testing for Endogenous Moving Patterns 
The Massachusetts reform’s coverage expansions likely appeal to individuals with pre-
existing conditions or a higher probability of facing future illness. This section therefore 
addresses another possible concern: that Massachusetts attracted sicker residents after the reform, 
either by making them less likely to leave the state or more likely to move there. If this is the 
case, our estimates may understate the reform’s true effect on health, as the positive causal effect 
would be tempered by negative selection.  
                                                        
20
 As an alternative approach to testing the common trend assumption, in Appendix Table A3 we conduct three 
falsification tests restricting the sample to the pre-treatment years 2001-2005.  The first considers 2001-2003 to be 
the “before” period and 2004-2005 the “after” period, while the second treats 2001-2002 as the “before” period and 
2003-2005 as the “after” period.  The third classifies 2001-2002 as the “before” period, 2003 as the “during” period, 
and 2004-2005 as the “after” period.  None of these tests produce any evidence of differential pre-treatment trends 
between Massachusetts and the other states. 
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We test for endogenous moving patterns by examining whether the demographic and 
financial profile of Massachusetts residents changed following the reform in a way that would 
suggest a change in the underlying propensity towards health of the state’s population. We first 
conduct a linear regression of health status index on the individual-level control variables among 
the pre-treatment portion of the sample, using the coefficient estimates to predict health for the 
entire sample. We then estimate the influence of  ∗  and  ∗ , along with 
the state and time fixed effects, on predicted health status. Table 6 reports the results. The 
coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are both negative, consistent with Massachusetts 
health care reform attracting sick individuals, but the effects are small and insignificant at the 5% 
level. It therefore seems unlikely that endogenous moving patters are meaningfully attenuating 
the estimated impact of the reform on health. 
IVe. Tests Related to Inference 
 This section conducts tests to help rule out the possibility that the statistical significance 
observed in the baseline regression is merely an artifact of underestimated standard errors. First, 
following Bertrand et al.’s (2004) suggestion, we compress all the available data into a state-
level panel with three time periods – “before”, “during”, and “after” – and regress state average 
health index on  ∗ ,  ∗ , and state and time period fixed effects. Next, we 
compress the data into only two cross-sectional units – Massachusetts and other states – and ten 
years, defining 2006 and 2007 as the “during” period and 2008 to 2010 as the “after” period. We 
then regress average health index on  ∗ ,  ∗ , a Massachusetts dummy, 
and year fixed effects. As shown in Table 7,  ∗   remains statistically significant in 
both regressions despite the small sample, and the effect sizes in standard deviations (of the 
individual-level health index) are similar to those from Table 4.  
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 In the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010), we also consider a different approach to inference 
and ask how likely it would be to estimate similarly large health improvements simply by 
picking any state at random. We re-estimate the baseline ordered probit regression with each of 
the other 50 states as the “treated” unit. Only two states – Oregon and Florida – had larger 
positive “treatment effects” than Massachusetts. The probability of obtaining as large a health 
improvement as that estimated for Massachusetts by chance is therefore 4%, below the standard 
5% significance level.21 Moreover, the result for Oregon could potentially be explained by the 
2008 Medicaid expansion shown to improve self-assessed health by Finkelstein et al. (2011).             
IVf. Other Health Outcomes 
 This section moves beyond the overall health index and explores the effect of the reform 
on a variety of additional health outcomes: number of days out of the past 30 not in good 
physical health, not in good mental health, and with health-related functional limitations; 
activity-limiting joint pain; BMI; minutes per week of moderate physical activity and vigorous 
physical activity; and smoking status. These variables were chosen because they satisfy two 
conditions: 1) they are strongly and significantly correlated with the overall health index in the 
expected direction (as shown in Appendix Table A4), and 2) they do not rely on a doctor’s 
diagnosis, since a diagnosis requires medical access which is endogenous to the reform.22  
Analyzing health outcomes beyond the overall self-assessed health index serves three 
purposes. First, verifying that we also observe improvements in health using a wide range of 
more specific (and therefore less subjective) questions increases our confidence that the reform 
                                                        
21
 We do not report the full set of results for all 50 states due to space considerations; they are available upon 
request. 
22
 The first condition excludes, for instance, alcoholic drinks per month, which is only weakly correlated with health 
and in the opposite of the expected direction.  The second condition excludes BRFSS questions that ask whether a 
respondent has ever been diagnosed with a particular chronic condition, such as diabetes and asthma. 
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did in fact improve objective – and not merely subjective – health. Second, examining additional 
outcomes sheds light on the mechanisms through which this effect occurred. For instance, 
obtaining health insurance can improve physical (or mental) health through increased utilization 
of medical services, mental health through lower stress from reduced financial risk, or health 
behaviors through expanded access to advice and information. Third, including the health 
behavior-related variables BMI and smoking tests a separate prediction of economic theory: 
reduced financial vulnerability to health shocks from insurance coverage could cause people to 
take more health risks, a phenomenon known as “ex ante moral hazard” (e.g. Dave and Kaestner, 
2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2011).  
Days not in good physical and mental health, days with health-related limitations, and 
minutes of moderate and vigorous exercise per week are non-negative count variables with 
variances higher than the means. We therefore estimate negative binomial models for these 
outcomes. The conditional expectation is given by 
 IJU|V, WM = V (11) 
where U is the number of days or minutes, W  is the over-dispersion coefficient, and V  is 
defined by  
 V = exp	([ +	[	( ∗ ) + [( ∗ ) +  !"# \% + ] + ^) (12) 
The treatment effect on the treated is defined as 
 H,PQ, = exp@[ + [ +  ,NO,"# \% + ]PQ + ^B − exp@[ +  ,NO,"# \% + ]PQ + ^B (13) 
while the average treatment effect on the treated is the mean of H among Massachusetts residents 
in the “after” period. 
 For the binary outcome variables (activity-limiting joint pain and smoking status), we 
estimate probit models of the form 
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 Pr	( = 1) = Φ	(_ +	_	( ∗ ) + _( ∗ ) +  !"# `% + a + b (14) 
with the treatment effect on the treated being 
 H,PQ, = Φ(_ +	_ +  !"# `% + &PQ + b) − Φ(_ +  !"# `% + aPQ + b) . 23 (15) 
Body mass index is continuous, so we estimate a linear regression in which the treatment effect 
is simply the coefficient estimate for  ∗ .  
Some of the health-related questions were not asked in Massachusetts in certain years, 
necessitating restrictions to the sample. Activity-limiting joint pain and the two measures of 
exercise are only available in odd-numbered survey years, meaning that the “during” period 
spans only six months (January 2007 to June 2007). We therefore combine those six months with 
the rest of 2007 and 2009 and classify the two years as the “after” period, dropping the  ∗
 interaction from those regressions. Additionally, the physical health, mental health, and 
health limitations variables are not available in 2002.    
Table 8 presents the results using the full control group of 50 states.24 Health care reform 
in Massachusetts is associated with reductions in the number of days not in good physical health, 
not in good mental health, and with health-related functional limitations, as well as a lower 
probability of having activity-limiting joint pain. The magnitudes of these reductions range from 
0.018 to 0.033 standard deviations, roughly similar to the size of the effect for the overall health 
status index. It therefore seems unlikely that the observed effect on the health index is driven 
purely by the subjectivity of the question. Moreover, these results suggest that the reform 
improved health more broadly than merely by reducing stress from lower financial risk. 
                                                        
23
 We include cigarette tax as an additional covariate in the smoking regression. 
24
 To conserve space, we do not present the results from the full range of specifications from Table 4 for these other 
health outcomes.  Unreported regressions verify that the conclusions reached are not driven by the choice of control 
group. 
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Turning to the health-behavior related variables, the reform is associated with a 0.025 
standard deviation reduction in BMI and a 0.036 standard deviation increase in moderate 
exercise, but no statistically detectable effect on vigorous exercise or smoking. These results 
suggest that expanded access to primary care improves at least some health behaviors, perhaps 
through information or accountability. The increase in moderate but not vigorous exercise is 
consistent with physician advice encouraging sedentary individuals to begin a light exercise 
routine, rather than encouraging those who are already active to increase or intensity their 
activity. The non-effect on smoking is consistent with evidence that smoking habits respond only 
gradually to external factors (e.g. Courtemanche, 2009), but could also reflect the health 
consequences of smoking already being widely-known even without physician access. 
Importantly, none of the regressions provide any evidence of ex-ante moral hazard causing 
individuals to take more health risks after obtaining insurance. 
The final column of Table 8 presents the results using as the dependent variable a 
“cardinalized overall health status index” equal to the predicted outcome from a regression of the 
health index on the six most plausibly objective health outcomes: functional limitations, joint 
pain, BMI, moderate exercise, vigorous exercise, and smoking (d = 0.27).25 This approach is 
advocated by Ziebarth et al. (2010) and others as a way to handle reporting heterogeneity in self-
assessed health. The impact of  ∗  remain positive and significant, and the effect size 
in standard deviations is similar to those from Table 4. This provides further evidence that our 
conclusions are not merely driven by subjectivity.         
 
                                                        
25
 We also considered dropping health limitations from the set of variables used to make the prediction, or using all 
eight alternate health outcomes to make the prediction. The results were virtually identical. 
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IVg. Heterogeneity 
 We next return to the actual overall health status index and examine heterogeneity in the 
effect of Massachusetts health care reform on the bases of gender, age, race, and income. Kolstad 
and Kowalski (2010) found the largest coverage expansions among men, young adults, 
minorities, and those with low incomes. However, different effects on coverage do not 
necessarily translate to different effects on health, as the impacts of coverage on health could 
also be heterogeneous. We consider the following subsamples: women; men; ages 18-34, 35-44, 
45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75 and older; whites; blacks; Hispanics; other race; and household 
incomes below $25,000, between $25,000 and $75,000, and above $75,000. We choose these 
income splits in order to loosely align with the provisions of the reform, which specify that 
health insurance be free up to 150% FPL ($23,050 for a family of four) and subsidized up to 
300% ($69,150 for a family of four).26 We estimate the baseline ordered probit model for all 
subsamples, with one exception. The baseline model gives an implausibly large magnitude for 
the 75 and older subsample, which upon further investigation appears to be driven by differential 
pre-treatment trends between Massachusetts and non-Massachusetts residents of that age group. 
We therefore include linear state-specific trends for that subsample.27  
 Table 9 reports the results for the gender and age subsamples. The impact on health is 
positive and significant for both women and men but stronger for women. Stratifying by age, the 
effect is largest among the near-elderly aged 55-64, second largest among those 45-54, smaller 
among the two groups below 45, and smaller still among the two elderly groups. Our finding that 
                                                        
26
 2012 federal poverty lines are available at coverageforall.org/pdf/FHCE_FedPovertyLevel.pdf, accessed 6/26/12. 
Since the BRFSS only reports income categories and lacks comprehensive information about household size, lining 
up the categories to exactly match 150% and 300% of the poverty line is not possible. 
27 Recall that differential pre-treatment trends did not appear to be an issue for the full sample, and including state-
specific trends for the full sample did not meaningfully affect the results. This suggests that the baseline estimator 
without state trends is still appropriate for the full sample, even if it is not for the 75 and over age group.    
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the effect of the reform diminishes dramatically at age 65 is not surprising since individuals 
eligible for Medicare cannot purchase insurance through the Connector (Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Massachusetts, 2006). It is interesting, though, that we still observe some evidence of health 
improvements among the elderly despite Medicare. Only those seniors who have paid Medicare 
taxes for at least ten years (or whose spouse has done so) are eligible for free Medicare Part A 
(Johnson-Lans, 2005), and presumably those seniors ineligible for Medicare could purchase 
community-rated insurance through the Connector. Indeed, in our data the reform increases the 
coverage rate of the elderly by a statistically significant 0.3 percentage points, an effect similar to 
that found by Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) using the National Inpatient Sample. Moreover, 
seniors could be affected by system-wide changes in the delivery of health care following the 
reform, such as reduced crowds in emergency rooms or the improvements in some dimensions of 
quality of care noted by Kolstad and Kowalski (2010).  
 Table 10 stratifies by race and income. Chapter 58 improved health across all racial 
subgroups, but the effect was largest for blacks and those of a race besides white, black, or 
Hispanic. A back-of-the-envelope calculation provides a ballpark estimate of the extent to which 
the reform reduced the health disparity between blacks and whites. In Massachusetts in the 
“before” period, the mean health status indices of blacks and whites were 2.553 and 2.786, 
respectively, for a difference of 0.233. The treatment effects imply changes in the health status 
indices of blacks and whites of 0.081 and 0.036, for a difference of 0.045. We therefore estimate 
that the reform reduced black-white health disparities by 19.3%. Stratifying by income, the 
reform improved the health of all three income groups but had the largest effect amongst those 
with incomes below $25,000 for whom insurance premiums are heavily or fully subsidized. 
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IVh. Instrumental Variables 
 We close the empirical analysis by using  ∗   and  ∗   as 
instruments to estimate the impact of having insurance coverage on health. This instrumental 
variables approach requires stricter assumptions than the reduced-form model, as the reform 
must only impact health along the extensive margin of insurance coverage, conditional on the 
controls. This assumption would be violated if the reform also influenced health through the 
intensive margin of coverage, for instance by causing some individuals to switch from high-
deductible catastrophic coverage to more comprehensive coverage available through the 
Connector. This assumption would also be violated if the reform affected the health of those who 
did not switch insurance plans through system-wide changes to health care delivery or peer 
effects. Despite these caveats, the instrumental variables analysis is useful because it estimates 
the magnitude of the impact of insurance on health that would be necessary for the extensive 
margin to be the only channel through which the reform influenced health. If the magnitude is 
implausibly large, then other mechanisms must play a role as well. Since the assumption that the 
entire effect on health occurs through the extensive margin of coverage is unlikely to hold for 
Medicare beneficiaries, we exclude seniors from the analysis in this section. 
 The first stage predicts insurance coverage using the following linear probability model: 
 T = W + W	( ∗ ) + W( ∗ ) +  !"# f% + g + h +  (15) 
where T is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person reported having any health insurance 
coverage. Because of the non-linearity of the second stage, we utilize a two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) approach in which the residual from the first-stage regression is included as an 
additional regressor in the second stage. Terza et al. (2008) show that in non-linear contexts 
2SRI gives consistent coefficient estimates, while traditional two stage least squares does not. 
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The second stage is modeled as an ordered probit and the probabilities of being in each of the 
five health states are given by, 
 Pr( = 0) = Φ(>	 − i	T −  !"# jk − i6l − & − ')  (16) 
 Pr( = ?) = Φ@>A − i	T −  !"# jk − i6l − & − 'B − 	Φ@>AC	 −i	T −  !"# jk − i6l − & − 'B, ∀	E ∈ (2,3,4)  
(17) 
 Pr( = 4) = 1 − Φ(>8 − i	T −  !"# jk − i6l − & − ')  (18) 
where l is the first-stage residual. The effect of health insurance on the probability of being in 
health state E is 
 ∆nA = Pr( = E|T = 1) −	Pr( = E|T = 0)  (19) 
The asymptotic standard errors of these probabilities and the standard errors for the second stage 
estimates were calculated following Terza (2011).28 Equation (19) represents the “local average 
treatment effect” of insurance among those who obtained coverage as a result of the reform, and 
is subject to the usual caveat regarding generalizability.  
 Table 11 reports the coefficient estimates of interest from the first and second stage 
regressions for the full sample, along with the estimated impacts of insurance on the health state 
probabilities. The first stage estimates an increase in the coverage rate of 1.9 percentage points in 
the “during” period and 5.4 percentage points in the “after” period. The F statistic from a test of 
the joint significance of  ∗  and  ∗  is large, suggesting the instruments 
are sufficiently strong. Turning to the second stage, obtaining insurance leads to a positive and 
statistically significant improvement in health. The first-stage residual is significant and 
negatively associated with health, providing evidence that an OLS estimator would suffer from a 
downward bias. Insurance is estimated to reduce the probabilities of being in poor, fair, and good 
                                                        
28
 Mata code is available upon request.  
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health by 6.2, 9.8, and 8.5 percentage points, while increasing the probabilities of being in very 
good and excellent health by 8.5 and 16 percentage points. The overall effect of insurance on the 
health status index, encompassing changes in all five probabilities, is 0.585 of the sample 
standard deviation. 
 These effects are strikingly large, but assessing their plausibility requires a comparison to 
other estimates from the literature. Finkelstein et al. (2011) employ the cleanest research design 
to date among studies of the impact of insurance on self-assessed health: a randomized 
intervention in Oregon granting Medicaid eligibility to a subset of the uninsured. They estimate 
that Medicaid enrollment increases the probability of being in good, very good, or excellent 
health by 13.3 percentage points. The sum of our estimated effects on the probabilities of being 
in those three health states is a similar 16 percentage points. The results from the two papers are 
not directly comparable given the differences in populations, but this similarity suggests that it is 
conceivable that the reform’s entire effect on the self-assessed health of the non-elderly could 
have occurred through the extensive margin of coverage. Future research should more directly 
investigate the roles of other potential channels. 
 We also conduct instrumental variables analyses for the gender, race, age, and income 
subgroups, allowing us to assess whether the heterogeneity in the reform’s effect on health 
observed in Section IVg comes from heterogeneity in the effect on coverage or the effect of 
coverage. Appendix Tables A5 and A6 report the results. The coverage expansions are larger for 
men than women, but women have greater health gains from coverage, explaining the greater net 
effect of the reform for women. Among the age subsamples, those under 35 years old have the 
largest gains in coverage, but also the smallest health improvements from obtaining coverage. Of 
the non-elderly age groups, 55-64 year olds have the smallest effect of the reform on coverage 
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but the largest effect of coverage on health. Stratifying by race shows that coverage rates 
increase the most for non-black minorities but that the health effects of coverage are the largest 
for blacks. Finally, the coverage expansions are the largest for the low-income group, second 
largest for the middle-income group, and smallest for those with high incomes. However, the 
effect of coverage on health is the strongest for the high income group.  
V. Conclusion 
This paper examined the effect of health care reform in Massachusetts on self-assessed 
health using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). An ordered 
probit difference-in-differences analysis showed that the reform increased the probability of 
individuals reporting excellent or very good health while reducing their probability of reporting 
good, fair, or poor health. These results were robust to alternative constructions of the control 
group and the addition of state-level covariates. We did not find evidence that the estimates were 
meaningfully impacted by differential pre-treatment trends or endogenous moving patterns. 
Next, we examined a number of more specific health outcomes and found improvements in 
physical health, mental health, functional limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and 
moderate physical activity. Testing for heterogeneity revealed that women, minorities, near-
elderly adults, and those with incomes low enough to qualify for the law’s subsidies experienced 
the largest gains in health as a result of the reform. Finally, we embedded the reform in an 
instrumental variables framework and estimated a large positive impact of obtaining health 
insurance on health.  
Perhaps the clearest limitation of our analysis is that all our health outcomes were self-
reported. Our finding of similar results across a range of health outcomes with varying degrees of 
subjectivity increases our confidence that our findings largely represent “real” changes in 
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physical/mental health. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the observed 
improvement in health could merely be due to a “warm glow” from acquiring health insurance. 
To underscore this point, recall that our estimated effects of insurance on self-assessed health are 
a similar magnitude to those of Finkelstein et al. (2011), and they found that a sizeable portion of 
the reported health improvements following the Oregon experiment occurred prior to measurable 
changes in overall health care utilization. Obtaining insurance coverage can reduce stress, which 
can directly improve numerous aspects of health even without any additional medical care being 
utilized, but Finkelstein et al. (2011) do raise the question of what the estimated improvements in 
self-assessed health are capturing.  
We argue that Finkelstein et al.’s (2011) finding regarding timing does not automatically 
apply to our context for several reasons. First, their data only tracked individuals for a year after 
the intervention, while we have 4½ years of data after first of the newly-insured in Massachusetts 
obtained coverage and 3½ years after all major facets of the reform took effect. If a “warm glow” 
from acquiring insurance was driving the effect, we would have expected the reported health 
benefits from the reform to diminish over time, but as Table 5 shows this was not the case. 
Second, other studies have documented changes in health care utilization in Massachusetts at 
around the same time as we observed health improvements (Kowalski and Kolstand, 2010; 
Miller, 2011a). Next, the newly insured in the Oregon experiment were winners of a random 
lottery, which could lead to a stronger “warm glow” than simply acquiring health insurance from 
a statewide intervention like the reform in Massachusetts. Accordingly, we consistently find that 
the effects on health were small at best in the “during” period, which includes nine months after 
those with incomes below 100% FPL became eligible for free coverage. We therefore do not 
seem to observe the immediate spike in self-assessed health seen in the Oregon experiment. 
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Nonetheless, as the necessary data become available it will be important to evaluate the impact 
of the Massachusetts reform on unambiguously objective measures of health such as mortality.           
Another natural question is the degree to which our results from Massachusetts can serve 
as projections for the Affordable Care Act. The general strategies for obtaining nearly universal 
coverage in both the Massachusetts and federal laws involved the same three-pronged approach 
of non-group insurance market reforms, subsidies, and mandates, suggesting that the health 
effects should be broadly similar. However, the federal legislation included additional cost-
cutting measures such as Medicare cuts that could potentially mitigate the gains in health from 
the coverage expansions. On the other hand, baseline uninsured rates were unusually low in 
Massachusetts, so the coverage expansions – and corresponding health improvements – from the 
Affordable Care Act could potentially be greater. Of course, larger coverage expansions may 
mean higher costs, and costs should be weighed against benefits when evaluating the welfare 
implications of reform. 
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Figure 1 – Changes in Health Status Index 2001-2010 
 
 
  
2.
55
2.
6
2.
65
2.
7
2.
75
2.
8
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
year
Massachusetts Other States
95% Confidence Intervals Pre-Treatment Trends
41 
 
Table 1 – Similarities and Differences between the Massachusetts Reform and the National Reform (ACA) 
 
Domain  Massachusetts reform National reform (ACA) 
Modification of existing insurance markets 
 - No pre-existing condition exclusions (since 1996). 
- Community rated premiums that can only vary by age and 
smoking status (in place since 1996). 
- No pre-existing condition exclusions. 
- Community rated premiums that can only vary by age and 
smoking status. 
 - Minimum standards for policies, including essential 
benefits and maximum out of pocket expenditures. 
- Minimum standards for policies, including essential 
benefits and maximum out of pocket expenditures. 
 - Creation of a state health insurance exchange where 
insurance companies compete to offer three regulated 
levels of coverage to small employers and individuals. 
- Young adults must be allowed coverage on their parents’ 
plans for up to two years after they are no longer 
dependents or until their 26th birthday. 
- States must create a health insurance exchange where 
insurance companies compete to offer four regulated levels 
of coverage to small employers and individuals. States are 
able to join multistate exchanges. 
- Young adults must be allowed coverage on their parents’ 
plans until their 26th birthday. 
Mandates - Individuals are required to purchase coverage if affordable, 
(based on income and family size) or pay a penalty of no 
more than 50% of the insurance premium of the lowest-
cost insurance exchange plan for which they are eligible.  
- Individuals are required to purchase coverage if it costs no 
more than 8% of income, or pay a penalty of the greater of 
2.5 percent of taxable income or $695. 
 - Employers with more than 10 full time employees (FTE) 
are required to offer policies with minimum standard or 
pay a penalty of up to $295 annually per FTE.  
- Employers with 50 employees or more are required to offer 
policies with minimum standard or pay penalties that range 
from $2,000-$3,000 per FTE. 
Medicaid expansions and subsidies  
 - Medicaid expansions for children with household incomes 
up to 300% of the poverty line (FPL), for long-term 
unemployed up to 100% FPL, and for people with HIV up 
to 200% FPL. 
- Free coverage for all adults below 150% FPL. Sliding scale 
of subsidies for adults up to 300% FPL. 
- Medicaid expansions to all individuals with incomes below 
133% FPL. 
- Sliding scale of tax credits for people up to 400% FPL. 
- Tax credits for employers with 25 or fewer employees and 
average annual wages less than $50,000 for offering 
coverage. 
Financing - Redirection of federal funding to safety net providers. 
- Redirection of the state uncompensated care pool, a 
mechanism through which hospitals were able to bill the 
state the cost of treating low-income patients. 
- Individual and employer penalties.  
- One-time assessment to health care providers and insurers. 
- Since 2009, a $1 per pack cigarette tax.  
- Reduction of Medicare reimbursements. 
- Increase in the Medicare payroll tax and extension of this 
tax to capital income for singles (families) with incomes 
more than $200,000 ($250,000). 
- Individual and employer penalties. 
- Taxes on insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and medical 
device manufactures. 
- Excise taxes on high-cost insurance plans (“Cadillac tax”).  
Sources: Gruber (2011a, 2008b) and Harrington (2010). 
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Table 2 – Pre-Treatment Means of Health Variables 
 
Variable MA 
(n=35,990) 
Other States 
(n=1,177,056)
Difference 
Any health insurance coverage 0.911 0.848 -0.063*** 
Overall health; 0 (poor) to 4 (excellent) 2.743 2.575 0.168*** 
Poor health 0.030 0.041 -0.011*** 
Fair health 0.089 0.112 -0.023*** 
Good health 0.261 0.294 -0.034*** 
Very good health 0.351 0.336 0.015*** 
Excellent health 0.270 0.212 0.054*** 
Days not in good physical health (of last 30)++ 3.271 3.479 -0.207*** 
Days not in good mental health (of last 30)++ 3.307 3.437 -0.130* 
Days with health limitations (of last 30)++ 1.916 2.080 -0.164*** 
Activity-limiting joint problems+ 0.123 0.133 -0.009** 
Body mass index 26.319 26.992 -0.673*** 
Minutes of moderate exercise per day+ 57.658 58.788 -1.130 
Minutes of vigorous exercise per day+ 40.065 38.830 1.235 
Currently smokes cigarettes 0.192 0.224 -0.032*** 
Notes: *** indicates difference between Massachusetts and other states is significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; 
* 5% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. + indicates variable from only odd-
numbered survey years. ++ indicates variable from all years except 2002. Standard errors are available on request. 
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Table 3 – Pre-Treatment Means of Control Variables 
 
Variable Massachusetts 
(n=35,990) 
Other States 
(n=1,177,056) 
Difference 
Age 18 to 24 0.114 0.121 -0.007* 
Age 25 to 29 0.083 0.089 -0.006** 
Age 30 to 34 0.107 0.105 0.002 
Age 35 to 39 0.105 0.104 0.001 
Age 40 to 44 0.116 0.112 0.004 
Age 45 to 49 0.100 0.101 -0.001 
Age 50 to 54 0.089 0.091 -0.003 
Age 55 to 59 0.073 0.073 0.000 
Age 60 to 64 0.056 0.056 0.000 
Age 65 to 69 0.045 0.047 -0.002 
Age 70 to 74 0.038 0.040 0.002 
Age 75 to 79 0.039 0.034 0.005*** 
Age 80 or older 0.035 0.030 0.005*** 
Female 0.510 0.502 0.008* 
Married 0.571 0.598 -0.028*** 
Race is non-Hispanic white 0.846 0.709 0.137*** 
Race is non-Hispanic black 0.034 0.098 -0.063*** 
Race is Hispanic 0.113 0.178 -0.065*** 
Race is neither black nor white nor Hispanic 0.006 0.015 -0.009*** 
Income less than $10,000 0.037 0.055 -0.018*** 
Income $10,000 to $15,000 0.039 0.056 -0.017*** 
Income $15,000 to $20,000 0.057 0.079 -0.022*** 
Income $20,000 to $25,000 0.077 0.096 -0.019*** 
Income $25,000 to $35,000 0.108 0.139 -0.031*** 
Income $35,000 to $50,000 0.149 0.172 -0.023*** 
Income $50,000 to $75,000 0.188 0.174 0.014*** 
Income $75,000 or more 0.345 0.228 0.117*** 
Less than a high school degree 0.071 0.114 -0.043*** 
High school degree but no college 0.251 0.299 -0.048*** 
Some college but not four-year degree 0.242 0.273 -0.031*** 
College graduate 0.436 0.314 0.121*** 
Currently pregnant 0.011 0.012 -0.001 
State unemployment rate 4.979 5.435 -0.456*** 
State cigarette tax (20010 $) 0.820 1.485 0.665*** 
State physician density (per 10,000 residents) 436.247 256.945 179.302*** 
State hospital density (per 10,000 residents) 1.208 1.701 -0.493*** 
Notes: *** indicates difference between Massachusetts and other states is significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; 
* 5% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. Standard errors are available on request. 
 44 
 
Table 4 – Difference-in-Differences Ordered Probit Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 Full 
Sample 
Match on 
Pre-Tx. 
Level 
Match on 
Pre-Tx. 
Trend 
Match on 
Pre-Tx. 
Coverage 
New 
England 
Drop CA, 
HI, ME, 
OR, VT 
Synthetic 
Control 
Group 
Drop 2005 Add State 
Controls/ 
Trends 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest 
   MA*During 0.017 (0.006)** 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.007)*** 
0.013 
(0.007)* 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.022 
(0.010)* 
   MA*After 0.039 (0.006)*** 
0.049 
(0.010)*** 
0.037 
(0.008)*** 
0.046 
(0.010)*** 
0.049 
(0.007)*** 
0.038 
(0.006)*** 
0.044 
(0.008)*** 
0.032 
(0.007)*** 
0.049 
(0.010)*** 
Average Treatment Effects on Treated (After Period) 
   P(Poor) -0.002 (0.0003)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0006)*** 
   P(Fair) -0.005 (0.0007)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.006 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
   P(Good) -0.007 (0.0009)*** 
-0.008 
(0.002)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.008 
(0.002)*** 
-0.008 
(0.001)*** 
-0.007 
(0.001)*** 
-0.007 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.008 
(0.002)*** 
   P(Very Good) 0.002 (0.0003)*** 
0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
0.001 
(0.0003)*** 
0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
   P(Excellent) 0.012 (0.002)*** 
0.014 
(0.003)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.013 
(0.003)*** 
0.014 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.013 
(0.002)*** 
0.010 
(0.002)*** 
0.015 
(0.003)*** 
Overall Effect in 
Std. Dev. 0.033 0.037 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.032 0.037 0.027 0.041 
# Control States 50 10 10 10 5 45 6 50 50 
Observations 2,879,296 633,979 643,302 578,530 340,592 2,664,194 390,453 2,582,055 2,879,296 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. In columns 2-5 and 7, standard errors are clustered at the state*year 
level rather than state because of the small number of states.  *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions 
include the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights.   
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Table 5 – Testing for Differential Pre-Treatment Trends and Delayed Effects  
 
                              Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 2-Year Splits 1-Year Splits 
MA*2003 to 2004 0.004 (0.007) -- 
MA*2005 to 2006 -0.014 (0.007) -- 
MA*2007 to 2008 0.032 (0.005)*** -- 
MA*2009 to 2010 0.039 (0.007)*** -- 
MA*2002 
-- 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
MA*2003 
-- 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
MA*2004 
-- 
0.010 
(0.008) 
MA*2005 
-- 
-0.039 
(0.007)*** 
MA*2006 
-- 
-0.0009 
(0.009) 
MA*2007 
-- 
0.026 
(0.008)** 
MA*2008 
-- 
0.024 
(0.008)*** 
MA*2009 
-- 
0.036 
(0.010)*** 
MA*2010 
-- 
0.028 
(0.009)** 
Observations 2,879,296 2,879,296 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown; average treatment effects on the treated are  
available upon request. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state,  
are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level;  
* 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables, state fixed  
effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of all 
50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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Table 6 – Testing for Endogenous Moving Patterns 
 
               Dependent Variable: Predicted Health Status 
 Coefficient 
Estimates 
MA*During -0.008 (0.004) 
MA*After -0.008 (0.008) 
Effect in Standard Deviations (After Period) -0.016 
Observations 2,888,559 
Notes: The coefficient estimates are equal to the treatment effects because  
the model is linear. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered  
by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1%  
level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. The regression includes state fixed effects,  
and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of  
all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling  
weights. 
 
 
Table 7 – Regressions with Aggregated Data 
 
                                             Dependent Variable: Average Health Status 
 State-Level with Three 
Time Periods 
 
Annual with Two 
Cross-Sectional Units 
(MA and not MA) 
MA*During 0.011 (0.006) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
   
MA*After 0.029 (0.005)*** 
0.032 
(0.014)* 
   
Effect in Standard Deviations (After Period) 0.027 0.030 
   
Observations 153 20 
Notes: The coefficient estimates are equal to the treatment effects because the model is linear. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors (clustered by state in the first column) are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant 
at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. The first regression includes state fixed effects and dummies for the 
during and after periods; the second regression includes year fixed effects and a dummy for MA. The control group  
consists of all 50 other states in the first regression, and one group consisting of all individuals from the 50 other 
states in the second regression. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights when aggregating. 
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Table 8 – Regression Results for Other Health Outcomes 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Days not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health 
Limit-
ations 
Activity-
Limiting 
Joint Pain 
BMI Minutes of 
Moderate 
Exercise 
Minutes of 
Vigorous 
Exercise 
Smoker Cardinal-
ized 
Overall 
Health 
MA*After -0.079 (0.011)*** 
-0.051 
(0.012)*** 
-0.065 
(0.013)*** 
-0.036 
(0.010)*** 
-0.143 
(0.047)** 
0.039 
(0.018)** 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.004)*** 
ATE on Treated -0.255 (0.037)*** 
-0.165 
(0.041)*** 
-0.128 
(0.028)*** 
-0.006 
(0.002)*** 
-0.143 
(0.047)**+ 
2.026 
(0.912)* 
-0.079 
(0.608) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.004)***+ 
Effect in Std. 
Deviations -0.033 -0.022 -0.022 -0.018 -0.025 0.036 -0.001 0.002 0.027 
Observations 2,642,885 2,649,994 2,663,473 1,333,179 2,794,388 1,217,299 1,217,299 2,878,751 1,122,083 
Notes: + indicates the treatment effect and coefficient estimate are equal because the model is linear. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by 
state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control 
variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. MA*During is also included for all outcomes except joint pain, exercise, and 
cadrinalized health, which are not available in odd-numbered survey years. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the 
BRFSS sampling weights. 
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Table 9 – Heterogeneity in the Effect on Health by Gender and Age 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 Gender Age 
 
Women Men 18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
MA*After 0.046 (0.006)*** 
0.029 
(0.006)*** 
0.023 
(0.010)* 
0.021 
(0.008)** 
0.036 
(0.007)*** 
0.060 
(0.011)*** 
0.019 
(0.006)** 
0.015 
(0.020) 
Average Treatment Effects on Treated 
     
 
   P(Poor) -0.003 (0.0003)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0002)* 
-0.0007 
(0.0002)** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.005 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
   P(Fair) -0.005 (0.0007)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0009)* 
-0.002 
(0.0008)** 
-0.004 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.008 
(0.001)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
   P(Good)  -0.008 (0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.002)* 
-0.004 
(0.002)** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.0007 
(0.0009) 
   P(Very Good) 0.002 (0.0003)*** 
0.001 
(0.0003)*** 
0.0001 
(-0.0001) 
0.00005 
(-0.0001) 
0.0009 
(0.0002)*** 
0.004 
(0.0009)*** 
0.002 
(0.0007)*** 
0.003 
(0.004) 
   P(Excellent) 0.014 (0.002)*** 
0.009 
(0.002)*** 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
0.007 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.017 
(0.003)*** 
0.005 
(0.001)*** 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Overall Effect in 
Std. Dev. 0.039 0.024 0.022 0.018 0.029 0.049 0.017 0.015 
Observations 1,733,131 1,146,165 485,376 512,575 614,489 563,405 398,264 305,187 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 
5 % level. All regressions include MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. For 
reasons discussed in the text, the 75+ regression also includes state-specific linear trends. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.   
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Table 10 – Heterogeneity in the Effect on Health by Race and Income 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
  Race Household Income 
  White Black Hispanic Other <$25,000 $25,000-$75,000 >$75,000 
MA*After 0.036 (0.005)*** 
0.091 
(0.012)*** 
0.041 
(0.016)* 
0.081 
(0.021)*** 
0.061 
(0.007)*** 
0.033 
(0.007)*** 
0.021 
(0.008)** 
Average Treatment Effects on Treated 
  
  
  
   P(Poor) -0.002 (0.0003)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.003 
(0.001)* 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.009 
(0.001)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0001)*** 
   P(Fair) -0.004 (0.0005)*** 
-0.013 
(0.002)*** 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
-0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.011 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0006)*** 
   P(Good) -0.006 (0.0009)*** 
-0.013 
(0.002)*** 
-0.005 
(0.002)** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.002)* 
   P(Very Good) 0.001 (0.0002)*** 
0.008 
(0.001)*** 
0.003 
(0.001)* 
0.009 
(0.003)*** 
0.009 
(0.001)*** 
0.003 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0004)*** 
   P(Excellent) 0.011 (0.001)*** 
0.024 
(0.003)*** 
0.011 
(0.004)** 
0.020 
(0.005)*** 
0.012 
(0.001)*** 
0.009 
(0.002)*** 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
Overall Effect in Std. Dev. 0.030 0.078 0.033 0.07 0.055 0.029 0.020 
Observations 2,320,271 222,581 287,895 48,549 842,088 1,346,946 690,262 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 
5 % level. All regressions include MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The 
control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.  
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Table 11 – Instrumental Variables 
 
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage 
Coefficient Estimates  
   MA*During 0.019 (0.002)*** 
   MA*After 0.054 (0.003)*** 
1st Stage F Statistic 171.42 
Second Stage: Overall Health 
Coefficient Estimates  
   Insurance 0.688 (0.112)*** 
   1st Stage Residual -0.663 (0.112)*** 
Local Average Treatment Effects 
   P(Poor) -0.062 (0.011)*** 
   P(Fair) -0.098 (0.015)*** 
   P(Good) -0.085 (0.013)*** 
   P(Very Good) 0.085 (0.013)*** 
   P(Excellent) 0.16 (0.026)*** 
Overall Effect in Standard Deviations 0.585 
Observations 2,172,797 
Notes: A linear probability model is estimated in the first stage so the coefficient 
estimate equals the treatment effect. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust  
and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 
the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include MA*During,  
the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for  
each month in each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states.  
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.  
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Appendix Tables (for online publication only) 
 
Table A1 – Estimating Effect on Health Using Series of Probits 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
P(Fair or 
Better) 
P(Good or 
Better) 
P(Very Good or 
Better) 
P(Excellent) 
Coefficient Estimates 
   MA*During 0.040 (0.010)*** 
0.030 
(0.007)*** 
0.028 
(0.009)*** 
0.001 
(0.007) 
   MA*After 0.070 (0.006)*** 
0.062 
(0.009)*** 
0.056 
(0.008)*** 
0.018 
(0.007)** 
Average Treatment Effect on Treated (After Period) 
   MA*After 0.004 (0.0004)*** 
0.010 
(0.001)*** 
0.018 
(0.003)*** 
0.006 
(0.002)** 
Effect in Std. 
Deviations 0.018 0.027 0.037 0.014 
Observations 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables, 
state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A2 – Estimating Effect on Health Using Series of Linear Probability Models 
 
Dependent 
Variable: P(Fair or Better) P(Good or Better) 
P(Very Good or 
Better) P(Excellent) 
Coefficient Estimates = Average Treatment Effects 
   MA*During 0.002 (0.0008)* 
0.007 
(0.001)*** 
0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
     
   MA*After 0.004 (0.0004)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.020 
(0.003)*** 
0.003 
(0.002) 
 
    
Effect in Std. 
Deviations 0.020 0.031 0.040 0.008 
     
Observations 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables, 
state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights. 
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Table A3 – Falsification Tests Using Pre-Treatment Data 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 Before: 2001-2003 
After: 2004-2005 
Before: 2001-2002 
After: 2003-2005 
Before: 2001-2002 
During: 2003 
After: 2004-2005 
MA*During -- -- -0.008 (0.008) 
    
MA*After -0.004 (0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
    
Observations 1,144,440 1,144,440 1,144,440 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown; average treatment effects on the treated are available upon request. Standard 
errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 
the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables, state fixed  
effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations 
are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A4 – Correlations Between Overall Health and Other Health Outcomes 
 
 Correlation with Overall Health 
Days not in Good Physical Health -0.472*** 
Days not in Good Mental Health -0.255*** 
Days with Health Limitations -0.381*** 
Activity-Limiting Joint Pain -0.322*** 
BMI -0.232*** 
Minutes of Moderate Exercise 0.063*** 
Minutes of Vigorous Exercise 0.130*** 
Smoker -0.118*** 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level.  
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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Table A5 – Instrumental Variables: Stratified by Gender and Age 
 
Gender Age 
 
Women Men 18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage 
Coefficient Estimates 
 
 
    
   MA*During 0.023 (0.002)*** 
0.016 
(0.003)*** 
0.027 
(0.004)*** 
0.016 
(0.004)*** 
0.012 
(0.002)*** 
0.021 
(0.002)*** 
       
   MA*After 0.042 (0.003)*** 
0.066 
(0.004)*** 
0.081 
(0.006)*** 
0.048 
(0.003)*** 
0.043 
(0.003)*** 
0.042 
(0.002)*** 
 
      
1st Stage F Statistic 142.34 201.3 105.63 159.19 138.04 224.35 
Second Stage: Overall Health 
Coefficient Estimates 
      
   Insurance 1.114 (0.159)*** 
0.420 
(0.107)*** 
0.355 
(0.122)** 
0.413 
(0.164)* 
0.871 
(0.164)*** 
1.424 
(0.266)*** 
       
   1st Stage Residual -1.075 (0.156)*** 
-0.402 
(0.109)*** 
-0.209 
(-0.126) 
-0.401 
(0.162)* 
-0.977 
(0.165)*** 
-1.566 
(0.275)*** 
       
Local Average Treatment Effects 
      
   P(Poor) -0.135 (0.019)*** 
-0.030 
(0.009)*** 
-0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.025 
(0.010)* 
-0.111 
(0.017)*** 
-0.302 
(0.046)*** 
       
   P(Fair) -0.156 (0.017)*** 
-0.058 
(0.015)*** 
-0.047 
(0.014)*** 
-0.056 
(0.022)* 
-0.122 
(0.020)*** 
-0.142 
(0.020)*** 
       
   P(Good) -0.084 (0.015)*** 
-0.063 
(0.015)*** 
-0.073 
(0.027)** 
-0.068 
(0.028)* 
-0.067 
(0.020)*** 
-0.037 
(0.015)* 
       
   P(Very Good) 0.151 (0.012)*** 
0.046 
(0.013)*** 
0.029 
(0.007)*** 
0.042 
(0.017)* 
0.127 
(0.015)*** 
0.209 
(0.019)*** 
       
   P(Excellent) 0.223 (0.037)*** 
0.106 
(0.026)*** 
0.102 
(0.038)** 
0.108 
(0.044)* 
0.172 
(0.041)*** 
0.198 
(0.053)*** 
       
Overall Effect in Std. Dev. 0.943 0.357 0.317 0.458 0.747 1.049 
Observations 1,299,806 872,991 483,775 512,155 613,948 562,919 
See notes for Table 11.  
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Table A6 – Instrumental Variables: Stratified by Age and Income 
  Race Household Income 
  White Black Hispanic Other <$25,000 $25k-$75k >$75,000 
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage 
Coefficient Estimates   
  
   MA*During 0.014 (0.002)*** 
-0.015 
(0.006)** 
0.041 
(0.007)*** 
0.074 
(0.019)*** 
0.064 
(0.008)*** 
0.016 
(0.003)*** 
0.006 
(0.002)** 
        
   MA*After 0.041 (0.002)*** 
0.056 
(0.004)*** 
0.093 
(0.006)*** 
0.136 
(0.011)*** 
0.138 
(0.009)*** 
0.070 
(0.003)*** 
0.015 
(0.002)*** 
        
1st Stage F Statistic 177.77 109.23 125.02 88.78 154.01 412.98 31.83 
Second Stage: Overall Health 
Coefficient Estimates 
   
   Insurance 0.905 (0.132)*** 
1.31 
(0.200)*** 
0.319 
(0.157)* 
0.793 
(0.194)*** 
0.446 
(0.069)*** 
0.405 
(0.116)*** 
1.440 
(0.538)** 
        
   1st Stage Residual -0.905 (0.134)*** 
-1.276 
(0.205)*** 
-0.240 
(-0.152) 
-0.851 
(0.196)*** 
-0.481 
(0.075)*** 
-0.341 
(0.117)*** 
-1.300 
(0.533)* 
        
Local Average Treatment Effects 
       
   P(Poor) -0.093 (0.016)*** 
-0.194 
(0.032)*** 
-0.025 
(0.014) 
-0.114 
(0.027)*** 
-0.068 
(0.010)*** 
-0.026 
(0.006)*** 
-0.138 
(0.030)*** 
        
   P(Fair) -0.114 (0.014)*** 
-0.175 
(0.015)*** 
-0.058 
(0.029)* 
-0.107 
(0.024)*** 
-0.071 
(0.011)*** 
-0.057 
(0.015)*** 
-0.189 
(0.043)*** 
        
   P(Good) -0.112 (0.015)*** 
-0.022 
(0.013)* 
-0.029 
(0.013)* 
-0.046 
(0.020)* 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.069 
(0.022)*** 
-0.182 
(0.092)* 
        
   P(Very Good) 0.117 (0.014)*** 
0.158 
(0.010)*** 
0.038 
(-0.020) 
0.106 
(0.020)*** 
0.06 
(0.008)*** 
0.052 
(0.011)*** 
0.203 
(0.013)*** 
        
   P(Excellent) 0.202 (0.030)*** 
0.233 
(0.040)*** 
0.075 
(0.035)* 
0.160 
(0.045)*** 
0.086 
(0.015)*** 
0.101 
(0.032)*** 
0.306 
(0.165) 
        
Overall Effect in Std. Dev. 0.783 1.087 0.271 0.667 0.388 0.381 1.486 
        
Observations 1,704,544 182,200 247,267 38,786 524,090 1,036,339 612,368 
See notes for Table 11. 
